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ABSTRACT
Analysts’ earnings forecasts are influenced by their desire to win investment banking clients. We hypothesize
that the equity bull market of the 1990s, along with the boom in investment banking business, exacerbated
analysts’ conflict of interest and their incentives to adjust strategically forecasts to avoid earnings
disappointments. We document shifts in the distribution of earnings surprises, the market’s response to
surprises and forecast revisions, and in the predictability of non-negative surprises. Further confirmation is
based on subsamples where conflicts of interest are more pronounced, including growth stocks and stocks
with consecutive non-negative surprises; however shifts are less notable in international markets.
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lakonish@uiuc.eduEquity research analysts make up a highly inﬂuential part of the investment industry. Investors pore
over analysts’ research reports and recommendations in order to obtain clues about the future prospects of
a stock. Firm managers try to cultivate favorable coverage by analysts, so as to attract investor attention and
boost their company’s stock price. Brokerage ﬁrms heavily promote research by their analysts as a means of
soliciting trading business from investors, as well as underwriting and merger advisory business from ﬁrms.
So much attention is devoted in the ﬁnancial news outlets to the pronouncements of analysts that a handful
of individuals, who command high proﬁles and high salaries to match, have attained the status of media
celebrities. The inﬂuence of analysts is backed up by many academic studies (see, for example, Givoly and
Lakonishok (1979), Womack (1996), Barber et al. (2001)) which ﬁnd that changes in analysts’ earnings
forecasts and recommendations contain information about future stock returns. Busse and Green (2002), for
instance, study television broadcasts of analyst opinions during part of 2000, and ﬁnd that traders respond
within seconds, considerably faster than the reaction time in earlier years.
The rise in analysts’ fortunes is intimately intertwined with the boom in the equity market during the
1990s. Many ﬁrms, especially those in the technology, media and telecommunications sectors, took ad-
vantage of their lofty valuations during this period to raise capital. Analysts played a prominent role in
drumming up demand for these stocks (Shiller (2000)), with many analysts continuing to tout them well
after the speculative excesses of the period became obvious. With the unravelling of the boom, however, the
analyst community has come under ﬁre. Numerous commentators chide the analyst community for “perpet-
uating a mania that fueled its own demise” (Santoli (2001)). The central damning charge against analysts is
that instead of providing impartial research they tend to be cheerleaders for the ﬁrms they cover. The abun-
dance of buy recommendations and the paucity of sell recommendations, for instance, has frequently been
cited as evidence of a lack of objectivity (Anderson and Schack (2002)). As another example, forecasts of
long-term growth in earnings consistently overshoot realized growth rates (Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok
(2002)). Public skepticism about the quality of Wall Street equity research has led to calls for increased
regulatory oversight of securities ﬁrms, including proposals to spin off the research divisions of brokerage
ﬁrms.
Analysts may not always issue objective forecasts for a number of reasons. Their opinions may be
1colored by personal career considerations. In the past, analysts were especially reliant on ﬁrm managers
for information. As a result, they may have been reluctant to issue negative opinions that would antagonize
ﬁrm management and jeopardize their access to managers. Even with recent regulations governing fair
disclosure, this motivation may still be at work. Importantly, securities ﬁrms in general do not explicitly
charge clients for research. Rather, analysts’ research contribute to a security ﬁrm’s revenues in other ways.
One lucrative source of revenue is from investment banking business. Accompanying the bull market of the
1990s was a spurt in investment banking activity, with companies raising capital and engaging in merger and
acquisition deals. Analysts started to take an active role in securing underwriting business. An analyst may
issue a bullish opinion about a stock in order to curry favor with executives who can direct future investment
banking business to the brokerage ﬁrm. Another source of revenues is from trading commissions. In order
to draw a larger clientele into buying a stock, an analyst may be predisposed to be more optimistic. In a
nutshell, analysts are compensated for roles beyond providing accurate and timely research to investors.
This exposes them to potential conﬂicts of interest that may undermine their objectivity.
An alternative response to these allegations is that research analysts use the existing information avail-
able to come up with opinions that are, at least on average, unbiased. However, unanticipated events occur,
or the research may have been based on faulty information, possibly deliberately supplied by managers to
tone down expectations (or even to mislead the public). Thus, analysts’ forecasts and recommendations can
be wide off the mark through no fault of their own. With the beneﬁt of hindsight, nonetheless, it is easy to
ﬁnd a convenient scapegoat in analysts’ research. Biases in analyst forecasts might also be attributable to
psychological factors that are unrelated to conﬂicts of interest. Humans are prone to a variety of cognitive
biases that lead to systematic judgmental errors, such as the tendency to extrapolate past trends too far into
the future.1
There are several ways in which analysts can express their opinions about a stock. They forecast long-
term growth rates and target price levels, and they issue buy or sell recommendations for a stock. By far
the most intense and sustained attention in the media, however, is lavished on analyst estimates of earn-
1See Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) for evidence from experimental studies in psychology. In the context of analyst behavior,
see DeBondt and Thaler (1990), and Abarbanell and Bernard (1992).
2ings. Furthermore, investors in recent years appear to have placed increasing emphasis on a ﬁrm’s earnings
performance. Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002a), Landsman and Maydew (2002) ﬁnd that the absolute
magnitude of abnormal returns, as well as abnormal volume, around earnings announcement dates have
increased from the 1980s to the 1990s. Additionally, Francis et al. (2002b) report an increase over time in
the market reaction to analyst forecast reports as well as earnings announcements. The popular perception
in recent years is that an earnings disappointment represents extremely bad news. The stock price is sent
plummeting, at least in the short term. Managers’ compensation packages are dragged down if this occurs,
and investor enthusiasm for the stock wanes.
Companies are hence under heavy pressures to ensure that earnings do not fall short of targets such as
security analysts’ forecasts. Managers exercise some discretion with respect to the timing, and magnitude,
of various revenue and expense items. They can thus manipulate earnings through accruals, for example (see
Chan et al. (2002)). Another way to avoid disappointments is to manage forecasts. Management can guide
analysts into toning down their forecasts, making it easier to match or surpass them. On their part analysts
may lend a helping hand by shaving their projections as the earnings announcement date approaches. If
investors do not see through such manipulation by managers and analysts, the stock price receives a boost.
This paper examines whether analysts bias their opinions in favor of a company by adjusting their
estimates in order to help managers match or exceed expectations. We focus on biases in earnings estimates
for a number of reasons. First, in light of the heavy emphasis investors and the media devote to earnings
results, the forecasted earnings number provides a natural vehicle for an analyst to paint a ﬂattering picture
of a ﬁrm’s prospects. Numerous articles in the popular press provide anecdotal evidence that analysts engage
in manipulation of their forecasts (see Fox(1997), McGee (1997), and Vickers (1997)). From a researcher’s
standpoint, it is relatively easier to check for bias in earnings estimates, compared to the other outputs from
analysts’ research. Stock recommendations, as well as target price forecasts and estimates of long-term
growth rates, extend over an unspeciﬁed horizon. As a result, it is hard to reconcile them with realized
performance in order to detect biases. Estimates on the other hand are issued each quarter, so they can be
confronted against realizations on a regular basis when earnings are announced.
WearguethatrecentU.S.marketconditionshaveincreasedthepredispositionofanalyststowardpositive
3surprises. We develop evidence in support of this argument along several lines. First, we document the
distribution of earnings surprises at the announcement date with a large cross-section of ﬁrms, and track its
evolution over an extended sample period. One way to deliver a pleasant surprise at the announcement date
is for managers or analysts to adjust opportunistically the path of estimates within the quarterly reporting
period. We also examine these within-quarter adjustments for traces of analyst bias.
Analysts’ predisposition to positive surprises is likely to be especially pronounced in ﬁrms that enjoy
favorable investor sentiment, such as stocks that trade at high relative valuation levels. Accordingly, we also
provide results for the sample partitioned into growth and value subsets. Firms that have a track record of
consistentlyexceedingexpectationsareespeciallysoughtafterbyinvestors. Asanotherwayofverifyingthat
there are subsets of stocks where the pressure to manage surprises is particularly pronounced, we analyze the
frequency of consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises (relative to the frequency expected by chance).
We round out our analysis with a regression model to predict the probability of a non-negative earnings
surprisebasedoncharacteristicssuchasrelativevaluationlevels, thetime-pathofwithin-quarteradjustments
of estimates, and the sequence of past surprises.
To trace out more clearly ﬁrms’ and analysts’ evolving incentives to manage surprises, we also examine
howthestockmarketrespondstoearningssurprises, andwhetherthisresponsehasheightenedovertime. We
study returns immediately surrounding earnings announcements, and also over relatively longer horizons.
In addition, we consider investors’ relative valuations of ﬁrms that consistently surpass expectations.
The incentives for ﬁrms and managers to manage earnings surprises is likely to be weaker in foreign
equity markets. Compared to the U.S. and the U.K., conﬂicts of interest due to investment banking business
are less severe in other markets. The overall level of initial public offering activity is lower and in general
competition for investment banking business is less keen. The compensation for analysts also is generally
lower. To throw into sharper relief our results on the U.S., we provide similar evidence on foreign markets.
Our general ﬁndings are as follows. Over the period 1984–2001, the cross-sectional distribution of
earnings surprises in the U.S. undergoes a pronounced shift. In particular the proportion of non-negative
surprises climbs over time from 48.88 percent in the late 1980s to 75.59 percent in 1999–2000. There is
strong evidence that the increased incidence of non-negative surprises arises from strategic adjustments of
4analyst forecasts over the reporting period. In cases where earnings fall short of the consensus three months
before the announcement, analysts become more willing in recent years to revise downward their estimates
by enough to yield a non-negative surprise upon announcement. These patterns are more pronounced for
growthﬁrmsthanforvalueﬁrms. Aswell, therearemoreinstanceswhereﬁrmsmeetorsurpassexpectations
for several quarters in a row than can be attributed to chance. At the height of the bull market during the
late 1990s, for example, growth ﬁrms who enjoy four consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises occur
35.4 percent more often than the expected frequency. The upshot is that the likelihood of a non-negative
surprise becomes increasingly predictable over time, based on a ﬁrm’s value-growth orientation, the sign of
past surprises, and the sign of the most recent revision in the consensus estimate. In contrast to the U.S.,
foreign markets do not exhibit an increased disposition to positive earnings surprises.
Our analysis of the market reaction to earnings surprises buttresses these ﬁndings. Over our sample
period the responsiveness of returns to surprises and forecast revisions grows, although the impact of sur-
prises is dominant. As well, ﬁrms associated with a consistent history of at least matching expectations
fetch markedly higher relative valuations. To a growing extent, therefore, managers and analysts have an
incentive to manage earnings and forecasts so as not to disappoint investors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we develop our argument concerning
how analysts’ conﬂict of interest can give rise to biases in earnings estimates, and describe the sample and
methodology. Section II describes the distribution of earnings surprises. Section III checks on the price
impact of earnings surprises. We examine the degree of persistence in earnings surprises in section IV,
as well as the valuation of ﬁrms who display persistence in earnings surprises. Section V develops probit
modelstopredictthelikelihoodofanon-negativesurprise. Theinternationalevidenceisdescribedinsection
VI. A ﬁnal section concludes.
5I. Background
A. The predisposition to positive surprises
The existence of an optimism bias in analysts’ forecasts is well-documented in many studies (Fried and
Givoly (1982), Klein (1990)). Early in the reporting period, analysts’ estimates on average tend to be
biased upward, and they are adjusted downward over the period. By the time of the announcement date, the
consensus estimate is generally aligned with actual earnings.
While this may have been the pattern in earlier years, recent market conditions may have worked to
compromise analysts’ impartiality, increasing their bias for at least some stocks. In particular, the lofty val-
uations produced by the strong bull market of the 1990s encouraged a surge in ﬁrms’ equity issuance. Ritter
and Welch (2002) report that the volume of initial public offerings (adjusted for inﬂation) approximately
doubled from the 1980s to the 1990–94 period, doubled again from 1995–98, and doubled yet again (to $65
billion per year) from 1999 to 2000, ultimately declining in 2001 to $34 billion. The average underwriting
fee for seasoned equity offerings also climbed in real terms from $2.7 million in the late 1980s to $5.3 mil-
lion in the late 1990s (Mola and Loughran (2002)). Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) survey corporate
chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers and ﬁnd that ﬁrms place the highest priority on research coverage when selecting an
underwriter.
Firms’ eagerness for coverage, and security ﬁrms’ thirst for lucrative investment banking business, sug-
gest that the independence of research analysis may be traded off against the chance to win clients. An
industry executive compares current market conditions with the past by noting that now “top analysts are
truly neck and neck with top investment bankers, because the two now go hand in hand. The number of
research analysts that had the capacity to bring in signiﬁcant numbers of deals was very limited in the
1980’s.”2
We thus posit that there is an upward trend over time in the tendency of analysts to generate positive
earnings surprises. Earnings surprise is measured as the difference between actual earnings per share and
the consensus estimate immediately prior to the announcement date (our methodology is spelled out in more
2Morgenson (2001).
6detail in subsequent sections). Note that this point provides one basis for distinguishing between different
explanations for analyst biases. Under the alternative hypothesis that forecasts are formed objectively and
errors arise from unforeseen events, there should not be any trend over time in the distribution of earnings
surprises. Similarly, human foibles in forecasting should not display trends over time.
However, an analyst’s predisposition to help ﬁrm managers beat the estimate is not likely to apply
equally to all ﬁrms. The accuracy of earnings forecasts still forms one basis of an analyst’s compensation
(see the evidence in Hong and Kubik (2002)). An analyst may thus issue unbiased forecasts for many stocks.
The importance of not falling short of expectations, however, is especially high for growth stocks or stocks
that have consistently done better than expected in terms of past earnings. In such cases there is likely to
be a heavy dose of investor optimism about future prospects that is built into the stock price. Since the bar
for future performance is set very high, a disappointing earnings announcement can be unduly harsh on the
stock price (see La Porta et al. (1997)). Managers, and analysts indirectly, will thus come under particularly
intense pressure to ensure that earnings do not fall short of forecasts. Growth ﬁrms are also more frequently
involved in capital-raising activity, so disappointing earnings may hinder their access to capital. To keep
their current investment banking clients (and to attract future business), analysts have an incentive to avoid
earnings disappointments. Lastly, growth stocks that capture investors’ enthusiasm are likely to experience
intensive trading activity. An analyst may not wish to imperil this source of trading commission income,
and so may be more inclined to smooth the way for a positive surprise. Conversely, there is less reason to be
a booster for ﬁrms that are out of favor with investors, such as stocks with poor past performance or value
stocks. These are less likely to be heavily traded, and since they have not been growing they are unlikely to
be potential investment banking clients.
In short, we argue that the probability of a positive surprise is ex ante predictable. Observable charac-
teristics such as a ﬁrm’s value-growth orientation and its past success in beating expectations are likely to
be associated with the likelihood of a positive surprise. Such characteristics denote the extent of potential
conﬂicts of interest which may compromise the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts.
There is some existing evidence in the ﬁnance literature on analyst biases due to conﬂicts of interest.
They center mostly on stock recommendations, however, and stop short of the late 1990s, when the conﬂicts
7of interest were particularly acute. Michaely and Womack (1999), for example, investigate analyst recom-
mendations around initial public offerings. Dugar and Nathan (1995) also study earnings estimates but their
sample period spans only six years and ends in 1988.
B. Data and methodology
We analyze the quarterly earnings forecasts for all domestic common equity issues covered on the IBES
Daily Detail Earnings Estimate History File. Our sample period extends from the second quarter of 1984,
when the number of available ﬁrms becomes sufﬁciently large, to the ﬁrst quarter of 2001.
The consensus forecast of a ﬁrm’s earnings that is commonly extracted from the IBES database is the
mean over all analysts’ estimates that are outstanding as of the middle of a month (the Thursday before the
third Friday of the month). To safeguard against the possibility that any bias we uncover is a consequence
of using a stale measure of expectations, we construct a customized consensus estimate that is more timely
than a monthly consensus mean. Speciﬁcally, on each day prior to an announcement of quarterly earnings,
we ﬁnd the median of all valid estimates for a ﬁrm. A forecast by an individual analyst is considered to be
valid unless it is placed by IBES on the stopped estimate ﬁle. As a further safeguard we require a ﬁrm to
have at least ﬁve valid forecasts. After applying these criteria there are on average 1157 ﬁrms in the sample
each quarter.3
We use the median forecast to avoid giving too much weight to an individual prediction that may be
relatively extreme. Using the median for the consensus also provides a simple intuitive interpretation of our
results. In a case where realized earnings exceed the median, for example, we can be sure that at least half
the analysts issued estimates that are below actual earnings. Such instances thus provide a direct validation
of the hypothesis that each analyst has an incentive to generate a positive surprise.
In related research DeGeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) highlight the importance of meeting psy-
chological threshold levels for earnings. Zero net income represents one important perceptual baseline, for
3Both actual and forecasted earnings are from the same source (IBES), so that the two can be meaningfully compared. IBES
(as well as the other major databases supplying actual and forecasted earnings data) ensures that the reported earnings number
corresponds to what the majority of analysts are forecasting. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) compare forecast errors from different
data sources. Their results suggest that the distribution of forecast errors is generally quite similar across different data vendors.
8example, as does the consensus estimate. Similarly, coming in with a slight improvement, such as one or
two cents per share over expected earnings, might represent a psychologically important focal point. Such
discrete demarcations, however, are blurred if earnings are split-adjusted. Accordingly, we work with actual
and forecasted earnings per share as they originally appeared. The IBES convention of reporting earnings
on a split-adjusted basis introduces tricky issues, however. With the upward spiral in stock prices in the late
1990s, it is not uncommon to have cumulative split adjustment factors in excess of a hundred. The adjust-
ment factor for Cisco Systems, for example, is 288 (as of mid-2001). In this case a difference of one cent
between actual and forecasted earnings as they were originally reported translates into a split-adjusted dif-
ference of roughly three-hundredths of a cent. This overﬂows the precision of the data reported on the IBES
summary ﬁles, creating the impression that the earnings surprise is zero. The problem is particularly acute
for successful, high-ﬂying stocks, who also have stronger incentives to manage earnings and forecasts so as
not to disappoint. We are in a unique position to address such issues, because we work with a customized
data ﬁle from IBES that carries earnings and estimates as they were originally reported. Spot checks of our
measures of actual and forecast earnings indicate that they generally agree with other sources, such as the
Dow Jones News Retrieval Service and the IBES consensus estimate from the Summary ﬁle.
II. The distribution of earnings surprises
A. All ﬁrms
Table 1 summarizes the frequency distribution of earnings surprises over all ﬁrms in the sample. The dis-
tribution is tabulated every quarter and the results are then averaged over quarters. We provide averages
over the whole sample period (1984Q2 to 2001Q1) and for various sub-periods. In particular, the later sub-
periods generally coincide with the increase in market exuberance (and hence indirectly the potential for
analyst conﬂicts of interest) over 1995Q1 to 1998Q4, its peak (1999Q1 to 2000Q1), as well as its unravel-
ling after 2000Q2.
In panel A, over the entire sample period the mean earnings surprise is -2.32 cents per share, so on
average actual earnings fall short of the latest consensus forecast. There is an upward drift in the mean
9surprise over time, however. In the earlier subperiods the mean surprise is -5.8 cents in the ﬁrst subpe-
riod (1984Q2–1989Q4), enters positive territory in the 1995Q1–1998Q4 subperiod, and peaks at 1 cent in
1999Q1–2000Q1. This behavior is not driven by unexpectedly bad or good performance of a minority of
ﬁrms: the upward drift over time is just as striking for the median surprise. This starts at -0.86 cents in the
ﬁrst subperiod, and also peaks at 1 cent in the 1999–2000 subperiod. The behavior of both the mean and
median surprise thus indicates a rise over time in the tendency for analyst estimates to come in below actual
earnings and generate a positive surprise.
The cross-sectional dispersion of surprises has declined as well. The standard deviation of the distribu-
tion diminishes from 37.76 percent in the ﬁrst subperiod to 8.19 percent over 1999–2000, and stands at 10
percent in the last subperiod.4 The quartiles of the distribution in panel A also conﬁrm the downward trend
in the dispersion of surprises.5 The reduced variability in surprises is consistent with the argument that in
recent years managers and analysts have engaged in a concerted effort to manage surprises.
Panels B and C provide additional details on the distribution of surprises. Over the full sample period, on
average 48.57 percent of the surprises are positive (actual earnings exceed the forecast). The overall average
masks an increase over time in the frequency of positive surprises. In the ﬁrst subperiod, 43.3 percent of
the cases are positive, and the frequency of positive surprises during the ﬁrst part of the 1990s is similar.
The frequency rises above ﬁfty precent in 95Q1–98Q4, peaks at 59.48 percent and falls to 54.95 percent
in the last sub-period. Recall that we record the consensus forecast one day before the announcement date.
Since the time-window between the consensus and the announcement is so short, it is unlikely that there
is a systematic bias due to unexpectedly favorable overall economic conditions. Hence there is no reason
to expect that the probability of a positive surprise should differ notably from the probability of a negative
4In the calculations of the means and standard deviations, we mitigate the impact of outliers and data errors by trimming all
surprises at the 1-st and 99-th percentiles of the distribution; in addition all surprises larger than ﬁve dollars per share in absolute
value are excluded from these calculations. Our tabulations of the frequency distributions, on the other hand, do not exclude any
observations.
5In the earlier years of our sample period, there may be an inconsistency between the nature of the actual earnings reported by
a ﬁrm, and the earnings forecasted by analysts. For example, a ﬁrm may have reported earnings after extraordinary items, while
analysts may have projected earnings on an operating basis. Since 1985, IBES has adjusted reported earnings to place them on an
equivalent basis to what analysts forecast. The earlier inconsistencies may affect the summary statistics reported in panel A.
10surprise, even if it were argued that business conditions were unexpectedly robust in the late 1990s. Instead,
the trend in the distribution of surprises tracks the trend in market valuations, as well as the trend in the
volume of underwriting and investment banking activity activity noted above.
There is a similar trend in the frequency of zero surprises. The percentage of cases where the surprise
is zero increases from less than ten percent before 1994 to about 16 percent in the later part of the sample
period. This may reﬂect improvements in forecast accuracy due to better dissemination of information over
time, but it may also reﬂect an increase in the desire of managers and analysts to avoid disappointments.
Together, analysts and managers may be managing earnings and expectations in order to tame negative
surprises. All in all, the incidence of negative surprises has tumbled from 51.13 percent in the ﬁrst sub-
period, to 24.41 percent when valuations peaked during 1999Q1–2000Q1, and 28.45 percent in the last
sub-period (see ﬁgure 1).
Panel C of Table 1 uses a ﬁner partition of the histogram to give more clues on how the distribution of
surprises has shifted. The buildup in the positive side of the distribution is concentrated in the interval from
zero to two cents per share. For example, in the 1984–89 subperiod 25.12 percent of the cases fall in the
interval between 0 and 2 cents (inclusive). At the height of the market during the 1999–2000 subperiod this
part of the distribution accounts for 58.86 percent of the observations. In spite of the large increase in the
frequency of positive surprises over these subperiods, cases where the surprise exceeds 2 cents actually fall
from 23.76 percent in 1984–89 to 16.73 percent in 1999–2000. These results are consistent with a growing
tendency for ﬁrms and analysts to manage surprises, either through managing earnings or through adjusting
forecasts. Overall, the percentage of large surprises (either positive or negative) in excess of two cents
in absolute value diminishes from 54.88 percent in 1984–89 to 26.80 percent in 1999–2000. Intriguingly,
despite the reduction in the magnitude of surprises over the sample period, the market response to the
information contained in earnings surprises has not diminished (see, for example, Francis et al. (2002),
Landsman and Maydew (2002)).
The analysis so far has been concerned with the dollar magnitude of earnings surprises. Even when the
surpriseamountstoseveralcents, however, itmaystillbesmallrelativetothelevelofearnings. Accordingly,
we also report in the last two columns of panel B the frequency of cases where the surprise is small in either
11absolute dollar magnitude or in relative terms. Speciﬁcally, a small positive surprise denotes a ﬁrm-quarter
where the earnings surprise is greater than zero and not more than one cent, or when the ratio of the surprise
to the absolute value of the estimate is greater than zero and not more than ﬁve percent. Small negative
surprises where actual earnings narrowly fall short of the consensus, are deﬁned in a corresponding manner.
Small positive surprises make up 13.98 percent of the observations in the ﬁrst subperiod. At the market
peak during 1999Q1–2000Q1, the percentage climbs to 22.58 percent in 1999–2000. In sum, small and
zero surprises make up an increasing percentage of the sample over time: from 19.56 percent in the ﬁrst
subperiod to 38.69 percent in 1999–2000. Conversely, small negative surprises become less likely in the
recent subperiod, as the percentage of such cases drops from 13.32 percent in 1984–89 to 8.17 percent in
1999–2000. The rise in the likelihood of small surprises reinforces the impression that the management of
surprises has grown over time. Speciﬁcally, beating forecasts by a wide margin may not be wholly desirable,
because the bar for future performance might be raised too high in this event. To avoid this, managers may
try to rein in earnings or defer them for future quarters.
The evidence in Table 1 suggests that managers and analysts have increased their efforts in recent years
to avoid letting down investors’ hopes with respect to earnings performance. In particular, the decrease over
time in the dispersion of surprises reﬂects an increasing tendency to manage expectations.6 Further, the rise
in the incidence of positive surprises is consistent with managers’ and analysts’ increasing predisposition to
put the best face on earnings performance and to steer clear of bad news about earnings.
B. Growth and value ﬁrms
The ballooning of valuations in the late 1990s was not uniform across different equity classes. For example
the price-to-earnings multiple for growth stocks hovered around 1.5 times the price-earnings multiple for
value stocks until the late 1990s.7 From 1998 on, however, the ratio soared, so the valuation gap between
6The dispersion may also be reduced if the overall level of earnings declined sharply over time. However, the magnitude of
earnings per share is not markedly different across the sub-periods. For example, the cross-sectional average earnings per share in
the ﬁrst sub-period is 78 cents per share and 44 cents in the last sub-period.
7These statistics are based on a comparison of the ratios of price to forecasted earnings between the Russell 1000 growth index
and the Russell 1000 value index, as reported by Salomon Smith Barney.
12growth and value ﬁrms widened dramatically in favor of growth ﬁrms, before peaking at about 3.5 times in
early 2000. In particular, ﬁrms in the technology sector commanded very high valuations, accounting for
roughly a third of the market value of the S&P 500 index. Similarly, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000)
report a striking widening over the late 1990s in the dispersion of returns across equity classes segregated
by size and book-to-market.
During the same period many growth ﬁrms, particularly those in the technology, media and telecommu-
nications sectors, were intensively engaged in raising capital as well as merger activity. Firms and analysts
would thus have been been especially anxious to paint a rosy picture of these ﬁrms’ earnings prospects in or-
der to maintain favorable investor sentiment. Further, given growth ﬁrms’ steep valuations in the late 1990s,
the penalties for earnings disappointments were potentially harsher for growth ﬁrms. These considerations
suggest that the incentives to manage surprises are more acute for growth ﬁrms. To follow up on this line
of thinking, Table 2 reports the distribution of surprises for value (panel A) and growth (panel B) ﬁrms.
Value ﬁrms are those whose book-to-market value of equity ratios exceed the median NYSE ﬁrm; growth
ﬁrms have positive book-to-market ratios that place them in the bottom quartile based on NYSE ﬁrms. The
breakpoints are chosen so as to obtain a roughly comparable number of ﬁrms in each group.
The two sets of ﬁrms share similar distributions of earnings surprises up to the mid-1990s. In the ﬁrst
sub-period, for example, the percentage of positive surprises is about 45 percent for value ﬁrms and 44
percent for growth ﬁrms. Thereafter, the distributions of the two groups diverge sharply. Growth ﬁrms enjoy
an increasing tendency for positive surprises over the later sub-periods. For these stocks the incidence of
positive surprises rises to 67.10 percent in 1999–2000. On the other hand, negative surprises in this group
fall from 47.03 percent in the ﬁrst sub-period to 15.08 percent in 1999–2000. At the market peak from 1999–
2000 the average surprise for growth ﬁrms is 1.74 cents, as opposed to only 0.10 cents for value ﬁrms. In
comparison, changes in the distribution for value ﬁrms are much milder. The proportion of positive surprises
for value ﬁrms in 1999–2000 (51.57 percent) is not much different than the proportion at the beginning of
the entire sample period.
To sum up, the tendency to tilt surprises toward zero and above is more pronounced for growth ﬁrms than
for value ﬁrms. If analyst forecasts are unbiased, there is no reason to think that the distribution of surprises
13should differ across different kinds of ﬁrms. On the other hand, the incentives to manage surprises have
become sharper in recent years for growth ﬁrms. As a result, analysts’ conﬂicts of interest are exacerbated,
creating a bias in their forecasts for growth ﬁrms.
C. The distribution conditional on earnings forecast error
Under the hypothesis of forecast rationality a forecast made early in the quarter is as unbiased as a fore-
cast later in the quarter. Put another way, the sign of the forecast error based on the estimate late in the
quarter should resemble the sign of the forecast error based on the estimate early in the quarter. In partic-
ular if the original forecast error is negative one should expect to observe on average a negative surprise
upon announcement. In recent years, however, as the tolerance for earnings disappointments has fallen,
managers and analysts come under pressure to manipulate earnings or forecasts in order to forestall bad
news. Suppose, for example, that as the announcement date approaches it becomes increasingly clear that
actual earnings will under-perform the outstanding forecast. The desire to maintain a reputation as a good
forecaster will prompt analysts to lower their estimates. With the added pressure in recent years to avoid
earnings disappointments, managers and analysts also face an extra urgency to moderate expectations. Man-
agers will hence try to guide down forecasts. Analysts may be motivated to lower their estimates by enough
to eke out a non-negative surprise at the announcement date. The reverse situation – where it becomes clear
that earnings will exceed original expectations – yields a less sharp prediction. Nonetheless, in such cases
analysts will still try to ensure that when the actual numbers are released there are no unpleasant surprises.
In Table 3 we check on this hypothesis by splitting the sample into two sets of ﬁrms, based on whether
the forecast error early in the quarter is at least zero or strictly negative. In panel A of each part of the table,
we calculate the error based on the consensus three months prior to the release of actual earnings. In panel
B of each part of the table we replicate the experiment using the forecast error based on the consensus one
month prior to the actual announcement.
Part I of Table 3 reports for all ﬁrms the frequency of positive, negative and zero earnings surprises,
conditional on the sign of the forecast error earlier in the quarter. Cases where the forecast error early in
the quarter is negative (actual earnings fall short of original expectations as given by the consensus taken
14three months before announcement) indicate ﬁrms who require more of a helping hand from analysts to
come out at least equal to expectations. In the ﬁrst subperiod (1984–89), of the ﬁrms with negative forecast
errors based on the consensus three months prior to announcement, 82.86 percent experience a negative
earnings surprise when actual results are released. The fraction of negative surprises in this group drops
markedly to 58.68 percent in the 1999–2000 subperiod. Conversely, there is an upsurge in the proportion
of cases where the negative forecast error is transformed into a zero or positive surprise by the time of the
announcement date. In the 1999–2000 subperiod, 18.19 percent of the cases start with a negative forecast
error three months ago, but enjoy a zero earnings surprise upon announcement. An additional 23.14 percent
of the cases turn from a negative forecast error into a positive announcement surprise. The implication is
that analysts become more willing in recent years to adjust their estimates strategically within a quarter so
as to generate a positive surprise upon the announcement of actual earnings.
Conditioning on a positive or zero forecast error three months before announcement also turns up signs
of strategic adjustment of estimates to avoid disappointments. When the original forecast three months prior
to announcement is below or equal to realized earnings, in the ﬁrst subperiod 81.97 percent of the cases
experience a positive announcement surprise and 8.52 percent experience a zero surprise. During the 1999–
2000 subperiod the frequency of positive surprises is roughly the same (82.10 percent) while the frequency
of zero surprises climbs to 16.04 percent. As a result, the proportion of negative surprises diminishes from
9.51 percent in the 1980s to a mere 1.86 percent in 1999–2000.
Panel B provides results when the forecast error is based on the consensus one month prior to the
announcement date. Compared to panel A, analysts at this later date have more information about what
earnings are likely to be. Many may already have revised their forecasts, so as a result the ﬁndings in panel
B are more muted. Nonetheless, the evidence still suggests that some strategic adjustments in estimates take
place over the time left till the results are reported. Of the ﬁrms with negative forecast errors, for example,
80.72 percent suffer a negative surprise during the 1999–2000 subperiod, below the 94.39 percent observed
in the ﬁrst subperiod. In 9.69 percent of the cases during the 1999–2000 subperiod, the negative error as
recently as one month before the announcement date turns into a positive announcement surprise.
Part II of Table 3 provides results for value and growth ﬁrms separately. To avoid clutter, only the
15results from conditioning on the forecast error based on the consensus three months before announcement
are reported. When the forecast error is negative, the proportion of negative surprises is roughly the same
for value and growth stocks in the ﬁrst subperiod. We hypothesize, however, that in more recent years the
incentives to manage forecasts are higher for growth ﬁrms. In support of this argument, for growth ﬁrms
with negative forecast errors the percentage of negative surprises declines in 1999–2000 to 48.94 percent
(from 83.76 percent in the ﬁrst subperiod). Similarly, the incidence of zero surprises swells to 24.86 percent
(relative to 5.24 percent from 1984–89). In the case of value ﬁrms, the shifts in the distribution are less
stark. For example, given a negative forecast error, the frequency of negative surprises changes from 80.19
percent in the ﬁrst subperiod to 64.21 percent in 1999–2000.
The results from Table 3 provide further conﬁrmation of our hypothesis that analysts’ incentives jeopar-
dize their objectivity. In particular, during bullish markets analysts seem to adjust strategically their forecasts
in order to avoid negative earnings surprises. These incentives are especially pronounced for ﬁrms with high
valuations (growth ﬁrms), who are also more likely to be sources of investment banking business, compared
toﬁrmswithrelativelylowvaluations(valuestocks). Ofcourese, itisnotpossibletoidentifyunambiguously
whether it is analysts or ﬁrm managers (or both parties) who engage in manipulating surprises. Managers
may be responsible through the guidance they supply analysts or through their discretion over accounting
methods. In any event, given the close ties between managers and analysts and the repeated process of
providing earnings estimates every quarter, it is implausible that analysts persistently fail to see through any
manipulation carried out by managers.
III. The price impact of earnings surprises
In this section we ﬂesh out some of the forces behind the incentives for ﬁrms and analysts to manage
surprises. We focus on two aspects of these market incentives.
The ﬁrst issue concerns investors’ response to earnings news. In particular, there is a widely held per-
ception among market commentators that investors view a negative earnings surprise as a cause for alarm,
and jettison stocks that miss expectations. If this is so, then the observed decline in the incidence of negative
16surprises during the exuberant period of the late 1990s suggests that the market was punishing more severely
stocks that disappoint expectations. In this section we examine whether this is the case.
As noted above, one way to avoid an earnings disappointment is to adjust strategically the forecast.
However, such downward revisions generally trigger a negative stock price reaction. If analysts engage
in these adjustments, the implication is that downward revisions in estimates in recent years are penalized
less severely (at least in terms of the short-term price response), compared to missing expectations. In this
section we also examine the differential penalties for estimate revisions and earnings disappointments.
We carry out our analysis by estimating each quarter cross-sectional regressions of the form
rit = γ0 + γ1Sit +  it (1)
rit = γ0 + γ1Sit + γ2∆Fit + υit. (2)
We analyze buy-and-hold returns rit for ﬁrm i in quarter t over two horizons: an announcement window
starting three days before to one day after the announcement date of quarterly earnings, or a longer horizon
starting three months before to the day after the announcement. The current quarter’s surprise for the ﬁrm
divided by the stock price on the day prior to announcement is denoted by Sit. The forecast revision, ∆Fit,
denotes the difference between the most recent pre-announcement consensus estimate and the estimate three
months before announcement, all scaled by the stock price on the pre-announcement day. The variable ∆Fit
captures all the revisions in the consensus forecast over the current quarter. For a large fraction of the sample
the surprise is zero, thereby attenuating the estimated slope from the regressions. To get a sharper reading
of the association between returns and surprises, therefore, we apply the regression to ﬁrms where actual
earnings differ from the consensus by at least two cents.
Table 4 reports the time-series averages of the regression slopes as well as the cross-sectional standard
deviation of returns over the respective horizon. There is a striking increase over the sample period in the
cross-sectional dispersion of returns during the announcement window (part I). It starts at 5.28 percent at the
beginning of the sample period, grows to 12.31 percent over 1999–2000 and is 13.96 percent at the end of the
period. Theenhancedvariabilityinannouncementwindowreturnsissuggestiveoftheincreasingimportance
that investors have attached in recent years to ﬁrms’ earnings. Note that the market has become more
17sensitive even though our evidence indicates that earnings surprises are, to an increasing extent, manipulated
by ﬁrms and analysts.
Theaverageregressionslopesforearningssurprisesintheregressionforﬁve-dayannouncementwindow
returns climbs steadily up to the late 1990s. In the ﬁrst subperiod the average slope is 0.3382, while during
the heyday of the stock market boom from 1999–2000 the average slope is 3.7907. While the regression
slope increases over this period the economic impact may not go up correspondingly, because the cross-
sectional dispersion of surprises is smaller in the later subperiods (see Table 1). To get at the underlying
economic penalties and beneﬁts from surprises, we calculate the difference between the return when the
ﬁtted regression is evaluated at the 90-th percentiles of the regressors, and the return evaluated at the 10-th
percentiles of the regressors. The predicted spreads conﬁrm our ﬁnding that even though the dispersion of
surprises has shrunk over time the overall impact has increased. In the 1999–2000 subperiod, for example,
the regression yields a large difference in returns of 4.01 percent, compared to 0.72 and 2.17 percent in the
ﬁrst and second subperiods, respectively. These results help to explain the motivation that ﬁrms and analysts
have in recent years to manage earnings surprises.
After taking into account the surprise, there is virtually no relation between announcement window
returns and the revision from what the forecast was three months ago. The slope coefﬁcients are small and
not statistically signiﬁcant, as are the predicted return spreads. Whatever impact the revisions have is already
incorporated into the stock price prior to the announcement date.
To confront the importance of earnings surprises versus estimate revisions, we have to look at longer
horizons. Accordingly, in part II of the table we examine returns over a period starting three months before
and ending one day after the announcement date. To control for overall market movements we match each
stock with a portfolio based on its rank by size and book-to-market ratio, and deduct the matched portfolio’s
buy-and-hold return from the stock’s buy-and-hold return.8 The regressions in part II of Table 4 are based on
8The reference portfolios comprise all domestic common equities listed on the New York, American and Nasdaq markets with
available data on the CRSP and Compustat ﬁles. At the end of June each year stocks are ranked by market value of common equity
and placed in one of three groups: the largest 200, the next largest 800, and the remaining 2000. Within each size category, stocks
are ranked by their book to market value of common equity from high (value) to low (growth) and split into two groups with roughly
equal market capitalization. This yields six size-value control portfolios. The classiﬁcation procedure follows Chan, Karceski and
18these excess returns. The incentive to adjust downward strategically analysts’ forecasts should be stronger
if the market’s response, at least in the short term, to a revision is weaker than its response to a surprise (so
γ1 >γ 2 in equation (2)).
Both S and ∆F inﬂuence returns over a longer horizon. However, the coefﬁcient on earnings surprise is
generally larger than the coefﬁcient on forecast revision. The average coefﬁcient on earnings surprise over
the whole sample period is 3.8635, while the coefﬁcient for forecast revision is 3.2431. Both are reliably
different from zero over the whole sample period.9 During the peak from 1999–2000 both coefﬁcients take
on larger values than the overall averages; however the coefﬁcient on the surprise variable is still larger
(7.0002 versus 5.8871 for the revision variable). To assess the full impact of surprises and revisions, we
have to take into account the differences in the cross-sectional dispersions of the two variables. In this
regard, the return spread associated with earnings surprises dominates the spread associated with forecast
revisions. Over the entire sample period the spread is 6.80 percent for the earnings surprise variable, and
2.68 percent for forecast revisions. Although the spreads for both variables are higher during the peak from
1999–2000, the spread for earnings surprise is still larger than the spread for revisions (8.01 percent versus
3.60 percent).
The broad conclusion from the regressions is that there are potential payoffs, at least in the short run,
to managing surprises. The stock price impact of surprises dominates the impact of forecast revisions.
Lakonishok (2000), and is meant to reﬂect the behavior of the widely-used Russell indexes.
9Another interpretation of model (2) is as follows. The surprise as a percent of the pre-announcement price is S =
A−FLAST
PLAST
where A is actual earnings, FLAST is the latest consensus estimate before the announcement, and PLAST is the price one day
before the announcement. The estimate revision as a percent of the pre-announcement price is ∆F =
FLAST−FFIRST
PLAST where
FFIRST is the consensus three months before announcement. Manipulation of equation (2) yields




In this regard γ1 − γ2 measures the impact of the percentage earnings surprise on returns given the news about earnings as repre-
sented by the percentage forecast error based on the estimate three months ago. The impact of earnings news relative to original
expectations FFIRST is measured by γ2. We work with model (2) as formulated in the text because it facilitates an evaluation of
the penalty from revising the estimate down versus the reward from under-estimating actual earnings. Bartov et al. (2002) provide
estimates of equation (3).
19These results also ﬁt in with the rise in the management of surprises observed during the late 1990s, when
valuations were particularly extravagant. An intriguing corollary to this is that the market apparently takes
the surprise at face value, and does not see through the increasing tendency of ﬁrms and analysts to make
strategic adjustments to actual earnings or estimates in order to paint a rosy picture of earnings results.10
IV. The persistence of earnings surprises
Investors’ attention is especially drawn to stocks that have a consistent record of meeting or exceeding ex-
pectations. The classic example of a stock that has delivered an unbroken string of positive surprises, and
become highly sought after by investors, is Microsoft. In a related context, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok
(2002) document that stocks with a consistent history of high past growth in earnings are handsomely re-
warded by investors. In this section we narrow our focus to ﬁrms that are associated with favorable surprises
for several consecutive quarters. We argue that such cases represent instances where the management of
surprises takes on an added importance.
If surprises are managed to an equal extent across all ﬁrms, the frequency of non-negative surprises will
be high but there will be no excess persistence under our measure (the observed number and the expected
number of consecutive non-negative surprises will be equal). Excess persistence arises if a subset of compa-
nies is more intensively engaged in managing surprises than the population at large. In these cases analysts
and managers are attempting to avoid disappointments at almost any cost. Given the rich valuations com-
manded by many companies during the late 1990s, our conjecture is that during this period the incentive to
avoid negative surprises is particularly acute, and hence the likelihood of excess persistence is higher. By
the same token, persistence in the later subperiods should be exacerbated among growth ﬁrms compared to
value ﬁrms, because the inﬂated valuations of many growth stocks probably left them most vulnerable to
any surprises.
10It could be argued that, irrespective of the relative magnitude of the market’s response to revisions and surprises, managers
and analysts pay more heed to what happens when actual earnings are reported. Individual analysts’ updates of their estimates are
spread out over the quarter, so the attention of investors and the media to revisions is diffuse. In contrast a company’s announcement
of earnings is likely to receive concerted media coverage, so the focus of investors and journalists is more intense.
20A. Continuations in earnings surprises
Our procedure for uncovering persistence in earnings surprises follows Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok
(2002). At the end of each quarter we consider all stocks that survive over a given future horizon. We use
horizons from one (the quarter that has just ended) to ten quarters. For each horizon we ﬁnd the proportion
of companies that have earnings surprises that are zero or higher in each quarter over the horizon. This
proportion is compared to the proportion that would be expected if a non-negative surprise is random and
occurs independently across quarters. For the expected proportion in a given quarter we use the empirical
proportion of non-negative surprises realized each quarter in the sample period. That is, at the end of quarter
q the expected proportion of ﬁrms with non-negative surprises over each of the next H quarters is given by
ΠH
h=1pq+h−1 (4)
where pj is the proportion of ﬁrms that have non-negative surprises realized in quarter j. The calculations
are repeated at each quarter-end, and the actual and expected proportions are averaged over all quarter-ends.
Panel A of Table 5 describes the results based on all ﬁrms. For the overall sample period, on average
59.3 percent of the ﬁrms experience a non-negative surprise in a given quarter. Since we calibrate the
expected proportion from the realized sample proportions, the expected and realized proportions match for
a horizon of one quarter. Firms that experience four consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises make up
25.8 percent of the sample on average. We should observe 14.9 percent of ﬁrms accomplish this solely by
chance, so the observed incidence is 10.9 percent higher than expected. Firms that have a string of eight
consecutive non-negative quarterly surprises constitute 12.5 percent of the sample, which is 9.5 percent
more than expected by chance.
The excess persistence above the expected level generally rises over the subperiods. In the ﬁrst subpe-
riod, for example, the persistence at four quarters is 6.2 percent more than expected, and at eight quarters
is 2.9 percent more than expected. As the relative valuations of growth and value stocks diverge more and
more sharply over time, the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of consecutive non-
negative surprises also mount. In the late 1990s, the difference at four quarters is 17.3 percent and at eight
quarters is 21.1 percent. The trend suggests that the management of surprises becomes more intense in a
21period of rising markets for at least some ﬁrms, including perhaps those who are most vulnerable to shifts
in investor exuberance.11
Panels B and C of Table 5 replicate the analysis for value and growth ﬁrms respectively. The deﬁnitions
ofthesecategoriesareasinTable2. Inthecaseofvaluestocks, persistenceovertheexpectedlevelismeager.
Even at the market peak during the late 1990s, the difference between the actual and expected frequencies of
fourconsecutivenon-negativesurprisesis2percent. Fortheseﬁrms, atleast, thereisnodifferentialincentive
to manage surprises. On the other hand, the differences between actual and expected frequencies are large
for growth ﬁrms, particularly in the late 1990s. Growth ﬁrms enjoy non-negative surprises for four quarters
in a row by 35.4 percent more than expected. The corresponding differences during the ﬁrst sub-period for
growth ﬁrms are much lower. The percentage of growth ﬁrms who generate non-negative surprises for eight
quarters consecutively during the late 1990s is especially striking (51.2 percent, or a margin of 42.5 percent
above expected). This is a strong clue that for a substantial number of growth ﬁrms during the peak of the
bull market, negative earnings surprises were viewed as intolerable, and the management of surprises was
an overriding concern.
B. Persistence and valuations
This section investigates whether investors anticipate continuations in earnings surprises, and whether they
reward companies that consistently meet or beat expectations. We do this by seeing whether ﬁrms that
display consecutive surprises of the same sign are associated with different valuations either on an ex ante
or an ex post basis. This analysis also underscores the motivations that ﬁrms and analysts have to manage
surprises.
We take the ratio of book to market value of equity as our valuation measure. This variable is widely
employed: for example, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) use it to examine how the market responds
to consistently high growth in earnings. It is also relatively well-behaved in that it sidesteps issues involving
11We obtain qualitatively similar results if we look at ﬁrms with consecutive quarterly surprises that are strictly positive. For
example, over the whole sample period the fraction of ﬁrms that beat the consensus estimate for four quarters in a row is 15 percent
or 8.5 percent more than expected. In the 1999–2000 subperiod the corresponding fraction for four consecutive positive surprises
is 28 percent, or 16 percent more than expected.
22negative earnings or low base values of earnings that bedevil other indicators such as the price-to-earnings
ratio. Speciﬁcally, at each calendar quarter-end we identify the stocks that experience runs of consecutive
non-negative quarterly surprises (the run can be from one to ten quarters in length). We measure the median
book-to-market ratios for each sample of stocks, both at the beginning of the run and at the end of the
run. As a basis of comparison, we perform the same calculations for stocks that do not achieve consecutive
runs of non-negative surprises. This procedure is repeated each quarter, and the statistics averaged over all
quarter-ends are reported in Table 6.
Table 2 suggests that non-negative surprises are more prevalent for growth ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is rein-
forced in Table 6. In any given quarter the ﬁrms that experience a non-negative surprise in that quarter have
a beginning median book-to-market ratio of 0.45, compared to 0.52 for ﬁrms with a negative surprise. More
generally, stocks that are associated with runs of consecutive non-negative surprises tend to have somewhat
lower ex ante book-to-market ratios than ﬁrms that do not achieve runs. Over the entire sample period,
for example, ﬁrms that have four consecutive non-negative surprises have a median book-to-market ratio of
0.40 at the beginning, compared to 0.48 for ﬁrms that do not enjoy runs of four consecutive non-negative
surprises. A possible explanation for this is that the ﬁrms that subsequently have consecutive non-negative
surprises already have a history of non-negative surprises.
The change in book-to-market ratios from the beginning to the end of the horizon indicate how mar-
ket valuations respond to a run of successive non-negative surprises. Although a single quarter where the
surprise is non-negative has no effect on the book-to-market ratio, valuations show a response after longer
runs of surprises. Over a horizon of four quarters, for example, ﬁrms that enjoy a streak of consecutive
non-negative surprises start with a median book-to-market ratio of 0.40 (or are valued at roughly 2.5 times
book value) while the comparison sample has a median ratio of 0.48 (or trade at about 2 times book). At
the beginning, then, the ﬁrms that subsequently enjoy a run of four quarters are trading at 1.2 times (2.5
2 )
the multiple of the comparison sample. At the end of the streak their valuations are 1.4 times the multiple
of the comparison group. Investors become even more enthusiastic about stocks that enjoy eight successive
quarters of non-negative surprises: their relative valuations with respect to the comparison sample climb
from 1.2 times at the beginning to 1.7 times at the end.
23Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000) ﬁnd that the stock market performance of value and growth
stocks diverged widely during the late 1990s. There is related evidence on this in Table 6. In the 1999Q1–
2000Q1 subperiod, for example, stocks that enjoy four quarters of non-negative surprises are rewarded at the
end of their streak with a relative multiple of 1.8 (0.49
0.28). The stark differences in relative valuations provide
another hint that the incentives of managers and analysts to manage surprises were exacerbated during the
late 1990s.
Our results on the valuation impact of quarterly earnings surprises echo those on long-term earnings
growth in Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002). Chan et al. (2002) ﬁnd that ex ante valuation ratios do
not predict future long-term growth in earnings. Instead, investors tend to extrapolate past growth and bid up
the values of ﬁrms that display persistence in past growth. In the present context, the strategic adjustment of
forecasts by analysts exaggerates the degree of persistence in quarterly surprises. However, investors appear
to overlook this distortion and handsomely reward stocks that consistently match or exceed estimates.
V. Predicting non-negative earnings surprises
We can formalize the degree to which there is persistence in quarterly surprises, as well as the contributing
role of analyst behavior, as follows. In particular, we develop a probit model for the incidence of a non-
negative surprise, based on the sign of previous quarterly surprises individually as well as collectively,
whether analysts have revised upward their estimates over the reporting period, and the stock’s value-growth
orientation. Deﬁne the variable yit such that it takes the value of one if ﬁrm i’s earnings surprise in quarter
t is non-negative, and zero otherwise. The full model is:






it + γ7V ALUEit−1 + γ8GROWTHit−1 +  it. (5)
The explanatory variable S+
t−j, j =1 ,...,4 takes the value of one if the ﬁrm’s earnings surprise in quarter
t − j is non-negative and zero otherwise. Similarly RUN4t−1 takes the value of one if all four previous
quarterly earnings surprises are non-negative and zero otherwise; ∆F+
t is one if the difference between the
consensus estimate immediately prior to the current quarterly announcement date and the consensus one
24month ago is non-negative, and otherwise the variable is zero. For stocks whose book-to-market value of
equity as of the prior quarter is ranked above the median for NYSE ﬁrms, the variable V ALUEit−1 takes the
value of one and is zero otherwise. The variable GROWTHit−1 equals one if the stock’s book-to-market
value of equity as of the prior quarter is positive and is below the 25-th percentile of NYSE stocks, and
equals zero otherwise. We allow for persistence by including the sign of the four most recent past surprises.
In addition we hypothesize that a string of consecutive surprises of the same sign is an indication that
managers and analysts are more prone to managing surprises, raising the likelihood that a negative surprise
willbeforestalled. Thestrategicadjustmentsofestimatesoverthecurrentreportingperiodprovidesafurther
clue as to whether the surprise will be favorable. Analysts are less likely to raise their estimates if this would
endanger the chances of a non-negative surprise. Finally, the high valuations of growth ﬁrms leave them
more exposed to the penalties of a negative surprise, and they are also more likely to be current or potential
investment banking clients. As a result, their incentives to manage surprises are larger, raising the ex ante
probability of a non-negative surprise. The model is estimated at each calendar quarter-end. Table 7 reports
statistics based on the time series of the estimated coefﬁcients.
As a starting point, part I of Table 7 estimates the model using information only about past surprises and
forecast revisions. Over the entire sample period the probability of a non-negative surprise is positively and
reliably related to each of the explanatory variables. In particular, the occurrence of a run of consecutive
non-negative surprises is strongly related to the likelihood of a subsequent non-negative surprise. The slope
coefﬁcient is 0.1276 with a t-statistic of 4.27. The slope coefﬁcient for estimate revisions is also reliably
positive, so prior adjustments in analyst estimates reliably predict non-negative surprises. The predictabil-
ity in the incidence of non-negative surprises is consistent with the argument that managers and analysts
manage surprises so as to avoid disappointments and give a favorable impression of the ﬁrm’s earnings per-
formance. To add weight to this argument, the predictive power of runs and estimate revisions is enhanced
over the 1999–2000 subperiod. The coefﬁcients of both variables are about 0.19, larger than the estimates
over the overall period. As well, the chi-square statistic for the joint signiﬁcance of the variables in the
model is markedly higher during the late 1990s, indicating that a non-negative surprise became much more
predictable in those years.
25Part II of Table 7 extends the model beyond lagged surprises and forecast changes to include the ﬁrm’s
book-to-market orientation. In line with our results from the earlier tables, the likelihood of a non-negative
surprise is sharply higher for growth ﬁrms than for value ﬁrms. This is particularly so at the height of market
exuberance during the 1999–2000 subperiod. The average coefﬁcient for the growth indicator in quation (5)
is 0.2157 during this subperiod, compared to the value indicator’s coefﬁcient of -0.2294 (the t-statistics are
4.19 and -6.65 respectively). As another perspective on the difference between growth and value ﬁrms, we
evaluate equation (5) using the estimated coefﬁcients from part II of Table 7. In the case of a value ﬁrm
whose four previous surprises are negative and where the forecast revision is negative, the model yields
an estimated probability that the next quarterly surprise is non-negative of about 32 percent for the overall
period. For a growth ﬁrm whose four previous surprises are all non-negative and where the forecast revision
is upward, the corresponding estimated probability is 81 percent for the overall period. The difference is
particularly stark in the 1999–2000 subperiod when relative valuations were most out of line: for the same
comparison the probability is 38 percent for value ﬁrms and as much as 93 percent for growth ﬁrms.
VI. International evidence
Compared to the U.S. market, the investment banking industry abroad is less developed, and the volume
of restructuring, initial public offering and other underwriting activity has generally been lower. Further,
the industry is less competitive. On their part analysts are much less visible and did not achieve the same
celebrity status as their U.S. brethren. Accordingly, the potential conﬂicts of interest that undermine analyst
research tend to be weaker in foreign markets. As a result, the experience of non-U.S. markets provides a
valuable test case to check for analyst biases induced by conﬂicts of interest.
In particular, we hypothesize that there should be a less pronounced shift over time in the distribution of
earnings surprises in foreign markets. To verify this hypothesis we examine the set of foreign stocks covered
on the International IBES ﬁle. Quarterly earnings reports are in general not available for foreign companies,
so we work with annual earnings announcements. For each ﬁrm, we construct a consensus estimate given by
the median of all valid outstanding analyst forecasts (we continue to require that the stock must have at least
26ﬁve outstanding forecasts). A further complication for the international sample is that in a large number
of cases earnings are released with a substantial delay after the ﬁscal year-end. It is not uncommon, for
example, for the release date to follow the end of the ﬁscal year by six months or more. By the time earnings
are publicly announced at this late date, investors probably have a good idea of what actual earnings will turn
out to be. Spot checks of the data, for example, yield numerous instances where the most recent forecast of
nearly every analyst prior to the announcement date exactly matches actual earnings. The implicaton is that
many individuals already have access to the information on actual earnings before the public announcement
date. To circumvent this issue we take the consensus forecast one month before the announcement date,
when there is potentially still some uncertainty as to actual earnings.12
Table 8 provides results on the percentage of positive, negative and zero surprises for the overall period
(1987–2001) as well as for subperiods. To ease comparisons with the U.S. evidence, we use annual sub-
periods that correspond as closely as possible to those in the earlier tables (although note that for the sake
of statistical efﬁciency in Table 8 we average the years 1998 and 1999, and the last subperiod comprises
the years 2000–2001). We also report the median surprise scaled by the absolute value of the consensus
estimate. On average there are 2776 ﬁrms per year for the entire sample of non-U.S. ﬁrms.
In sharp contrast to the U.S., there is no evidence of a predisposition to positive surprises in the pooled
sample of foreign markets (panel A). The median surprise (relative to the absolute value of the consensus)
in every subperiod is negative. Moreover the distribution of surprises is fairly stable over time. During
the ﬁrst subperiod (1987–89), for example, positive surprises occur in 39.40 percent of the cases while
negative surprises account for 49.82 percent of the cases. Over the 1998–99 subperiod the corresponding
percentages are 40.41 and 57.92 percent respectively. In short, the distribution for the pooled international
sample is reminiscent of what is observed for the U.S. in the 1980s, when conﬂicts of interest were less
pervasive in the analyst community.
The other panels of Table 8 break out the international sample into subsets which resemble to a greater
12We also replicate our analysis using the consensus two months before the announcement date, as well as the consensus imme-
diately prior to the announcement date. The results do not indicate a pronounced tilt toward positive surprises in foreign markets in
general, nor in the more recent subperiod.
27or lesser extent market conditions in the U.S., so as to sort out more clearly the role of analyst conﬂicts of
interest. Panel B reports the distribution of surprises for the major developed markets, as represented by
countries in the Morgan Stanley Capital International EAFE (Europe, Australia and Far East) index.
Of the individual countries in the EAFE index, the Japanese market makes up the dominant component
(in terms of the number of companies covered by IBES as well as market capitalization) over much of this
period. However, the performance of the Japanese equity market during the 1990s was generally lackluster,
and investment banking activity did not surge as in the U.S. As a result, there may have been less compelling
pressures to manage earnings surprises. In line with this conjecture, the distribution of earnings surprises in
Japan (panel C) does not show any signs of an increased predisposition to positive surprises over time.
On the other hand, the U.K. market, as well as many European markets, enjoyed a boom during the
1990s, especially in the technology and telecommunication sectors. They may thus have witnessed, as in
the U.S., a rise in investor exuberance as well as elevated valuations. Panel D provides results for stocks
drawn from the Continental European markets within EAFE. The proportion of negative surprises exceeds
ﬁfty percent in every subperiod, so the median surprise is less than zero in all the subperiods. Even during
the peak years of 1998–99, 50.99 percent of the surprises are negative. In this respect, the tilt toward positive
surprises witnessed in the U.S. does not extend to the continental European markets. While the incidence
of positive surprises in the European countries experiences some signs of a shift, the break is much milder
compared to the U.S. evidence. The percent of positive surprises in panel D, for example, stands at 36.77
percent during the late 1980s and rises to 47.06 percent in 1998–99.
The U.K. sample (panel E) is particularly interesting because the U.K. and U.S. share many similar
market features and institutional arrangements. In particular, the conﬂicts of interest prevalent in the U.S.
investment banking industry might also exist in the U.K. In the U.K. the proportion of positive surprises rises
from 44.96 percent in the late 1980s to 59 percent in 1998–1999. There is hence some evidence supportive
of the view that ﬁrms and analysts in the U.K., like their counterparts in the U.S., have become more prone
to managing surprises.
28VII. Conclusion
As the boom in the equity market of the 1990s faltered, security analysts in the U.S. came under increasing
ﬁre for the quality of their research. The popular perception is that the incentives for analysts have shifted,
so that instead of being impartial providers of unbiased opinions, they have become cheerleaders for the
ﬁrms they cover. One hypothesis is that because research does not in general directly generate revenues for
brokerage ﬁrms, analysts are susceptible to conﬂicts of interest that may lead to biases in analyst opinions.
Their impartiality may be compromised because they are also expected to secure underwriting and other
investment banking business, so they have an incentive to paint a ﬂattering picture of a company’s earnings
performance.
Analyst research may be tilted to favor a stock in several ways. Long-term growth rates in earnings or
price targets may be overstated, the stock may receive a bullish buy recommendation, or an analyst may
adjust forecasted earnings to ensure that actual earnings do not come up short of the estimate. Given the
wide attention in the media to stocks’ earnings performance, earnings forecasts provide a natural forum
for examining analyst biases. Moreover, analysts explicitly specify the horizon over which their estimates
apply and actual earnings are released four times a year, making the detection of any biases relatively more
straightforward.
We check for biases induced by analyst conﬂicts of interest by tracking the behavior over time in quar-
terly earnings surprises (the difference between actual earnings and the consensus forecast of analysts). Our
results indicate that the cross-sectional distribution of earnings surprises in the U.S. has undergone a pro-
nounced shift. In particular, there is a rise in the proportion of non-negative earnings surprises over time,
from 48.88 percent in the late 1980s to 75.59 percent in 1999–2000. The coincidence of this shift with the
climb in the equity market as well as in underwriting activity is one clue that analyst bias due to conﬂicts of
interest is a culprit here. More generally, this evidence suggests an expansion over time in the management
of earnings surprises. This may take the form of ﬁrm managers’ smoothing of reported earnings, as well as
analysts’ adjustments of their estimates (possibly with the guidance of ﬁrms) to yield good news upon the
announcement of actual results.
29Our evidence on analyst conﬂicts of interest is sharpened by narrowing the focus to two sets of ﬁrms:
growth ﬁrms, and ﬁrms that have experienced several consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises. Com-
pared to value ﬁrms, growth ﬁrms are more likely to raise fresh capital and to carry out mergers or ac-
quisitions. Analysts thus have stronger incentives to accomodate the interests of these potentially lucrative
investment banking clients. We conﬁrm that growth ﬁrms are more likely to be associated with non-negative
surprises, compared to value ﬁrms. During 1999–2000, for example, on average 84.91 percent of the ﬁrm-
quarter surprises are positive (compared to 52.96 percent during 1984–1989) for growth ﬁrms. Changes in
the distribution are comparatively milder for value ﬁrms (the proportion of non-negative surprises is 47.90
percent in the late 1980s and 65.81 percent in 1999–2000).
Firms that experience several consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises are particularly likely to be
instances of surprise management by ﬁrm managers and analysts. We document that there are more cases
of such runs of surprises than can be attributable to chance, and there is an upward trend in the frequency
of runs. During 1999–2000, the number of stocks that are expected to have six consecutive non-negative
surprises, to take an example, due solely to chance is 16.6 percent. The actual frequency of such cases is
38.2 percent, or more than twice the expected frequency. The results from a probit model conﬁrm that the
probability of a non-negative surprise can be reliably predicted from a ﬁrm’s value-growth orientation, the
sign of the most recent surprise, the occurrence of a run, and the direction of the most recent consensus
revision. In particular the predictive power of the sign of the forecast revision suggests that managers and
analysts are opportunistically adjusting earnings estimates in order to avoid disappointments.
To ﬂesh out the underlying motives for managers and analysts to engage in such behavior, we also
explore the market’s response to earnings surprises, forecast revisions and to runs of surprises. We conﬁrm
that the response of returns to surprises has been heightened in recent years. The average estimated slope in
a regression of announcement window returns on the earnings surprise is 3.7907 in 1999–2000, compared
to 0.3382 in 1984–1989. Since the impact of an announcement surprise dominates the impact of a previous
forecast revision, there is room for managers and analysts to engage in strategic manipulation of estimates
over a quarter. Moreover, investors handsomely reward stocks that achieve runs of non-negative surprises.
Stocks that enjoy eight consecutive quarters of non-negative surprises see their valuations (price-to-book
30ratio relative to stocks not subject to this experience) rise from 1.2 times at the outset to 1.7 times at the end.
The overall conclusion is that the incentives to manipulate actual and forecasted earnings so as to steer clear
of disappointments have been exacerbated in recent years.
A ﬁnal, persuasive piece of evidence comes from outside the U.S. market. The links between investment
banking and analyst research are in general weaker in foreign markets, so they provide a natural test case.
For the sample of foreign markets as a whole, the distribution of earnings surprises does not display an
increasing disposition to positive surprises, unlike the U.S. data. On the other hand, the U.K. enjoyed a
booming equity market in the late 1990s, especially for the technology and telecommunication sectors, and
offers close parallels to the U.S. in terms of investment banking activity and the media attention given to
analysts. Tellingly, of the foreign markets the U.K. displays the strongest signs of an increased disposition
to positive surprises. The proportion of positive surprises climbs from 44.96 percent in the late 1980s to 59
percent in 1999–2000. The non-U.S. results thus point a ﬁnger at the role of analyst conﬂicts of interest in
generating biases in earnings forecasts.
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34Table 1
Summary statistics and frequency distribution of earnings surprise, all ﬁrms
EarningssurpriseS foreachﬁrmineachquarteristhedifferencebetweenactualquarterlyearningspershare
and the most recent consensus forecast prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are measured
in cents per share (based on number of shares outstanding as of the earnings announcement date), and
are computed for all ﬁrms with data on the historical IBES ﬁle with forecasts from at least ﬁve analysts.
Numbers reported in the table are averages over all quarters from 1984Q2 to 2001Q1. In panel B, cases
are counted as small positive if the surprise relative to the absolute value of forecast earnings F satisﬁes
0 < S
|F| ≤ 0.05 or 0 <S≤ 1; cases are counted as small negative if −0.05 ≤ S
|F| < 0 or −1 ≤ S<0.
A. Summary statistics
Sample Standard 25th 75th
period Mean Median deviation percentile percentile
84Q2–89Q4 -5.80 -0.86 37.76 -8.71 4.78
90Q1–94Q4 -1.93 0.02 16.69 -4.37 3.28
95Q1–98Q4 0.54 0.76 7.87 -0.98 2.79
99Q1–00Q1 1.00 1.00 8.19 -0.20 3.40
00Q2–01Q1 0.06 0.75 10.00 -0.88 3.15
Overall -2.32 0.01 20.72 -4.53 3.68
B. Percentage of positive, negative, zero & small surprises
Sample Percentage of cases:
period Positive Negative Zero Small positive Small negative
84Q2–89Q4 43.30 51.13 5.58 13.98 13.32
90Q1–94Q4 46.36 43.92 9.73 16.92 12.93
95Q1–98Q4 53.91 29.81 16.28 24.32 11.29
99Q1–00Q1 59.48 24.41 16.11 22.58 8.17
00Q2–01Q1 54.95 28.45 16.60 20.94 9.30
Overall 48.57 40.69 10.74 18.32 12.11
C. Distribution of earnings surprise (cents per share)
Sample Percentage of cases:
period Below -2 −2 ≤ S<−1 −1 ≤ S<00 ≤ S ≤ 11 <S≤ 2 Above 2
84Q2–89Q4 31.12 14.49 5.51 11.08 14.04 23.76
90Q1–94Q4 21.37 14.95 7.59 19.12 18.96 18.01
95Q1–98Q4 10.80 11.25 7.76 32.03 24.09 14.06
99Q1–00Q1 10.07 7.86 6.48 32.01 26.85 16.73
00Q2–01Q1 12.38 9.10 6.97 31.46 24.45 15.65


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Frequency distribution and summary statistics of earnings surprise, international sample
Earnings surprise S for each ﬁrm in each quarter is the difference between actual quarterly earnings per
share and the consensus forecast one month prior to the announcement date. Earnings surprises are based
on number of shares outstanding as of the earnings announcement date, and are computed for all ﬁrms with
data on the historical International IBES ﬁle with forecasts from at least ﬁve analysts. The median is also
reported for the earnings surprise relative to the absolute value of forecast earnings. Numbers reported in
the table are averages over selected years, and over all years, from 1987 to 2001. In panel B of the table the
sample consists of ﬁrms on the Morgan Stanley Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) markets; in Panel C
the sample includes ﬁrms on the Continental European markets.
(A) All international
Sample Percentage of cases:
period Positive Negative Zero Median
(A) All international
1987–1989 39.40 49.82 10.78 -0.17
1990–1994 38.91 55.08 6.01 -1.27
1995–1997 41.97 54.78 3.25 -1.35
1998–1999 40.41 57.92 1.67 -3.57
2000–2001 39.62 58.96 1.42 -4.82
Overall 39.91 54.87 5.22 -1.85
(B) EAFE
1987–1989 39.89 48.38 11.73 0.00
1990–1994 39.37 54.22 6.42 -1.04
1995–1997 45.73 50.72 3.55 -0.26
1998–1999 42.33 56.02 1.65 -2.12
2000–2001 42.37 56.24 1.39 -3.16
Overall 41.54 52.86 5.60 -1.10
(C) Japan
1987–1989 53.60 45.91 0.49 1.48
1990–1994 32.47 66.45 1.08 -8.01
1995–1997 45.73 53.22 1.05 -2.44
1998–1999 28.01 71.30 0.69 -14.25
2000–2001 46.76 52.93 0.32 -1.45
Overall 41.24 57.97 0.78 -4.74
(D) Continental Europe
1987–1989 36.77 54.73 8.51 -1.20
1990–1994 35.72 56.21 8.08 -1.49
1995–1997 44.92 51.52 3.56 -0.41
1998–1999 47.06 50.99 1.95 -0.35
2000–2001 42.25 55.93 1.82 -4.13
Overall 40.15 54.24 5.61 -1.42
(E) U.K.
1987–1989 44.96 31.82 23.23 0.01
1990–1994 47.21 46.75 6.04 0.01
1995–1997 56.87 39.97 3.16 1.13
1998–1999 59.00 38.86 2.14 1.47
2000–2001 39.00 60.48 0.53 -5.11
Overall 49.17 43.18 7.65 -0.25